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Flexible Solidarity – 
Effective Solidarity?
While the Member States of the European Union are still 
divided about both their migration policies and politics, in 
particular about taking in (which number and which kind of) 
refugees, the so-called Visegrad Group or “V4 Countries” 
(Poland, Slovakia, the Czech Republic and Hungary) has/have 
proposed “flexible solidarity” as a new tool to handle the 
crisis and feasible alternative to resettlement and mandatory 
quotas. “Flexible solidarity”, they argue, “should enable 
Member States to decide on specific forms of contribution 
taking into account their experience and potential. 
Furthermore, any distribution mechanism should be 
voluntary.” Their clear intention is to find a pragmatic 
compromise in the hard-fought disputes with Germany and 
other Western Member States. In a “Joint Statement“ 

presented at the Bratislava Summit (16 September 2016) the 
V4 stress that for the Brexit-shocked Union “the outcome of 
the British referendum, though undesired, opens an 
opportunity to improve the functioning of the EU (…).” 
Doubtlessly, significant improvements are necessary – as the 
V4 continue to argue – in order to “restore common trust in 
the European project (…).” Among many other shared values, 
common trust, for sure, requires (more than a) minimum 
degree of solidarity. One wonders whether or not solidarity´s 
new “flexible” version might be more than a buzzword to 
gloss over the lack of substance.
1. Questions Arise
For any further evaluation, it is necessary to have a look at 
the definition given by the V4: “Migration policy should be 
based on the principle of the ‘flexible solidarity’. This concept 
should enable Member States to decide on specific forms of 
contribution taking into account their experience and 
potential. Furthermore any distribution mechanism should 
be voluntary.” Do flexibility and solidarity go hand in hand as 
form of experience-based burden sharing on a voluntary 
basis? The answer is neither a clear “Yes” nor a clear “No” 
neither. Albeit numerous references to solidarity are 
enshrined in the Union´s primary law (e.g. Art. 2 TEU, Art. 3 
III and V TEU, or Art. 222 TFEU), a precise legal definition is 
missing. This lack of conceptual clarity makes it all the more 
difficult to concretely apply the rather vague and abstract 
notion of “solidarity” to the migration and refugee law 
context. Before trying to do that, thus some decisive 
preliminary questions arise: Which overall expectations, 
moral obligations, political assumptions and – if at all – 
normative force can be attributed to what the Union Treaties 
in general phrase as “solidarity”?
2. Conceptualizations Matter
Conceived as mode of organizing a polity and, where such a 
polity transcends the nation state, as a mode of fostering 
transnational cooperation, solidarity reaches far beyond 
certain moral obligations the individual might have towards 
the other members of her or his polity (in private life, e.g., the 
family, in public life, e.g., the needy and left-behind ones by 
society). Constitutional law and theory have established some 
tradition to conceptualize solidarity as program and/or 
principle: for example in form of social rights, social security 
instruments, or revenue allocation schemes in federal states. 
Substantiations of this kind paved the way for shifting the 
solidarity paradigm from the domestic to the European plane. 
Art. 2 TEU, Art. 3 III and Art. 3 V TEU, though not expressly, 
but intrinsically hold solidarity to be a prerequisite for and an 
aim of integration. The Union, as said in Art. 3 III TEU is 
based upon “solidarity among Member States” and aims at 
achieving “solidarity among Member States” in an “ever 
closer” form (see Art. 1 II TEU). Solidarity operates as a 
principle to achieve common goals; sometimes it imposes 
common, sometimes it imposes differentiated obligations or 
responsibilities: it encompasses procedural and operational, 
substantive and normative elements, values and legal 
obligations (respectively entitlements) as famously outlined 
by R. Wolfrum (Solidarity amongst States: An Emerging 
Structural Principle of Public International Law, in: P.-M. 
Dupuy (ed.), Völkerrecht als Weltordnung. Festschrift für 
Christian Tomuschat, 2006, pp. 1087).
3. And so Does the Precise Normative 
Framework
Art. 2 TEU (to give only some further examples and more 
detailed explanations in the following) addresses the Union´s 
basic values and declares that these values derive from a 
society upholding, among others, the principle of solidarity. 
Besides plain economic interdependence, a political 
community needs a more demanding “bonum 
commune”-orientation: a common European “bonum 
commune” that is to say a common European “public wealth” 
based on shared public interests. Art. 3 TEU ranks the 
“bonum commune”-relevant solidarity among the Union´s 
aims and purposes promoting co-operative solidarity among 
the Member States (para 3) and in the global realm (para 5). 
Not surprisingly, solidarity and loyalty are of (and stem from) 
the same spirit as Art. 24 (3) TEU refers to a “spirit of loyalty 
and mutual solidarity”. Economic integration requires 
solidarity when grave difficulties arise (Art. 122 TFEU and 143 
TFEU). Most obviously, to fight terrorist attacks and to 
provide help in cases of natural or man-made disasters 
requires “solidarity”. This is literally made explicit by Title VII, 
Art. 222 (using the phrase “Solidarity Clause” as headline). As 
on the national plane, solidarity has found many 
substantiations in the European realm. Most importantly, 
solidarity in concretized in a human rights context which 
brings us also back to a human rights based refugee, asylum 
and migration law.
4. In Particular: Human Rights Matter
Solidarity has a human rights basis (social rights, right to 
minimum living conditions etc.). In that regard, the European 
Union can learn from the international community. UN-
General Assembly Resolution 59/193 on the “Promotion of a 
democratic and equitable international order” states under 
number 4 lit. f: “Solidarity, as a fundamental value, by virtue 
of which global challenges must be managed in a way that 
distributes costs and burdens fairly, in accordance with basic 
principles of equity and social justice, and ensures that those 
who suffer or benefit the least receive help from those who 
benefit the most.” The reference to a fair distribution of costs 
and burdens is quite the same argument which the V4 in 
their definition of “flexible solidarity”. However, the 
“responsibility to protect”, another international concept, 
may not be disregarded either. Far beyond the famous 1951 
Refugee Convention, the protection of refugees has a human 
rights basis. To be very brief and leaving aside further 
reference and dogmatic considerations: This human rights 
basis is shown by manifold right to asylum-guarantees (direct 
ones such as Art. 16 a German Basic Law or indirect ones 
such as the duty to protect human life or the non-
refoulement principle) in the constitutions of the Member 
States. It is moreover shown by the European Convention of 
Human Rights and the jurisprudence of the Strasbourg Court 
(e.g. as to the non-refoulement principle again) and finds also 
expression in the EU-Human Rights Charter. “Flexible 
solidarity” is an adequate mean if it supports the irrevocable 
human rights basis. “Flexible solidarity” turns into alarming 
lip-service if trying to undermine this irreversible human 
rights basis. Flexible solidarity can never justify an opt-out 
from human dignity-based human rights obligation. It can 
only work as an “opt in” to accept shared responsibilities in 
joined burden sharing. The Member States can volunteer on 
the “how” of burden-sharing. They cannot volunteer on 
accepting binding human rights standards. That has to be the 
leitmotif for any further discussions on all variations of 
solidarity whatsoever.
This post is a contribution to the symposium “Movement of 
People” which was inspired by the Conference “Movement of 
People” that was held at the University of Hamburg the 
23rd and 24th September of 2016.
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